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1Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between government agricultural programs and soil
erosion. Using county-level data from the years 1992 and 1997, we estimate a model of water-
induced (i.e., sheet and rill) soil erosion and crop insurance participation for counties where corn,
soybean, and winter wheat account for at least 90% of total planted acreage. This includes most
of the areas that have exhibited the highest historical levels of sheet and rill erosion. We ¯nd that
crop insurance participation and conservation payments are signi¯cantly associated with county
average soil erosion levels. In particular, corn insurance participation exhibits a positive impact
on soil erosion, while wheat insurance participation exhibits a negative impact. After controlling
for di®erences in soil erodibility, counties that receive higher conservation payments exhibit lower
levels of soil erosion. We also ¯nd that government price and income support program payments
(e.g., target price-based/loan de¯ciency payments and AMTA payments) exhibit no statistically
signi¯cant association with our soil erosion measure.
2Crop Insurance, Government Agricultural Policies, and Soil
Erosion
1 Introduction
Concerns about the potential impact of agricultural production on indicators of environmental
quality have become prominent in policy discussions and the environmental/economic literature.
A number of theoretical and empirical studies (for example, Chavas and Holt (1990); Horowitz and
Lichtenberg (1994); Wu and Brorsen (1995); Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004); and Wu (1999))
have been conducted to analyze the impact of disaster payments, crop insurance, price supports, and
acreage retirement programs on land allocation and input use. Many have argued that unintended
negative environmental consequences could result from acreage and input use changes in response
to government e®orts to stabilize farm income and reduce the risk associated with agricultural
production. In addition, concerns have been expressed that these programs may be working at
cross-purposes with other programs, such as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), that are
designed to mitigate the e®ects of the environmental damage resulting from agricultural production
activities.
Another line of research (for example, Pionke and Urban (1985) and Amos and Timmons (1983))
focuses on the impact of input and land use on measures of soil and water quality, though much of
this research has centered on the impact on water quality. A number of researchers (see Johnson,
Wolcott and Aradhyula (1990); Just and Antle (1990); LaFrance (1992); Innes and Ardila (1994))
have recently explored the theoretical connection between government policy, extensive and/or in-
tensive margin changes, and environmental outcomes. In particular, Innes and Ardila provided
a theoretical framework in which to study the impact of agricultural insurance on soil depletion.
While these studies have contributed to an understanding of the theoretical relationship between
production choices and environmental quality indicators, research that addresses the empirical con-
nection between government agricultural policies and environmental outcomes is relatively sparse
(for example, Wu (1999); Goodwin and Smith (2003); and Plantinga (1996)). The limited research
that has occurred has often been conducted over very small geographic areas. This limits the
ability to draw general conclusions based on the ¯ndings in these studies. On the other hand,
researchers who have attempted to study larger geographic areas have often not taken into account
the importance of site-characteristics and land heterogeneity.
Soil erosion is one of those key indicators of changes in environmental quality. Soil erosion is
de¯ned as the detachment and transportation of soil particles by wind or water activity (Larson,
Pierce and Dowdy 1983). The extent of soil erosion on agricultural land is dependent on the
1speci¯c use of the land (e.g., cultivated vs. noncultivated cropland), the level of cover vegetation,
the physical and chemical characteristics of the soil, and the agricultural practices employed on
the land. In particular, agricultural practices such as plowing, discing, and planting remove cover
vegetation and break down soil structure. The breaking down of the soil structure leads to increases
in leaching and surface runo®. Among other things, this increase in leaching and surface runo®
accelerates water quality degradation, habitat destruction, and °ooding associated with increases
in sedimentation. Therefore, soil erosion has a substantial impact on a number of measures of
environmental quality. In addition, soil erosion has a direct impact on the future productivity
of the land where the erosion occurs. Speci¯cally, soil erosion reduces the future productivity of
the soil by reducing plant-available water capacity, reducing plant-nutrient supply, degrading soil
structure, and minimizing the impact of chemical applications and other management strategies
(National Soil Erosion Soil Productivity Research Planning Committee and Administration 1981).
Several studies (Wu and Babcock (1998); Goodwin and Smith (2003)) have included soil erosion
in a structural model of agricultural production. Wu and Babcock included a dummy variable to
capture whether or not the farmer had purchased crop insurance, while Goodwin and Smith included
government program payments, in addition to crop insurance, as explanatory variables in their
soil erosion equations.1 While Goodwin and Smith included a measure of aggregate government
expenditures as an explanatory variable in their soil erosion model, they failed to account for
di®erences that may exist between the myriad of government programs available to the farmer.2
For example, payments tied to current production (e.g., loan de¯ciency payments) may induce
production activities that a®ect soil erosion, while payments that are \decoupled" from current
production (e.g., AMTA payments) may provide little incentive to alter production, and thus may
have little impact on soil erosion.
Recent research has demonstrated that di®erent agricultural policies may have signi¯cantly
di®erent impacts on crop mix and planted acreage. Keeton, Skees and Long (2000) and Gri±n
(1996) found substantial acreage increases due to the availability of federally-subsidized crop in-
surance, while Young, Schnepf, Skees and Lin (2001) and Goodwin et al. (2004) found relatively
small production increases due to insurance availability. Deal (2004) found that the impact of
crop insurance on planted acreage varies by crop and geographic location and that payments tied
to current production (de¯ciency payments), decoupled payments (AMTA payments), and ad hoc
payments (disaster and Market Loss Assistance payments) exhibit di®erential impacts on acreage
1Using an indicator variable having the value of one if the producer purchased crop insurance and zero otherwise,
Wu and Babcock found that crop insurance participation had no signi¯cant impact on a composite measure of water-
and wind-induced soil erosion.
2Goodwin and Smith found that their aggregate measure of government payments had a positive impact on soil
erosion, while crop insurance participation exhibited a negative, though very small, impact on soil erosion.
2response. Finally, Goodwin and Mishra (2003) and Adams, Westho®, Willott and Young (2001)
found that even decoupled payments may have a statistically signi¯cant, though quantitatively
modest, impact on planted acreage.
The goal of this paper is to extend the preliminary e®orts of Goodwin and Smith (2003) to ex-
plore the impact of government agricultural payment and risk management policies on soil erosion.
Instead of using aggregate government payment data, we employ county-level program payment
data for a number of di®erent government programs available to the farmer during the years 1992
and 1997. In addition to the government payment data, we employ National Resources Inven-
tory (NRI) and Soils Interpretation Record (SIR) data to provide measures of soil characteristics,
management practices, and conservation practices.3 While soil erosion occurs as a result of both
water-induced (i.e., sheet and rill) and wind-induced factors, we limit our study to sheet and rill
erosion.4 We use NRI data from 1992 and 1997 to estimate the impact of government payments and
crop insurance participation on soil erosion within a 2SLS framework. Although the variation in
our data is primarily cross-sectional, we use data from the 3 year period surrounding our 1992 and
1997 time periods in our soil erosion equations to model the expectation of government payments.5
This study is organized in the following manner. Section 2 provides a description of the empirical
model and data used in the study. Section 3 provides a presentation and discussion of the results.
A summation of the ¯ndings and concluding remarks are presented in the ¯nal section.
2 Empirical Framework and Data
To undertake this study, it is necessary to provide an empirically implementable de¯nition of soil
erosion. Soil erosion is de¯ned as the detachment and transportation of soil particles by wind or
water activity (Larson et al. 1983). While exact measures of soil erosion are di±cult to obtain, the
Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) has been employed frequently (see Amos and Timmons (1983)
and Goodwin and Smith (2003)) to proxy for soil erosion. The USLE was designed to predict long-
term average annual soil loss occurring from sheet and rill erosion on speci¯c lands where speci¯c
management and cropping practices were employed. The USLE equation is A = RKLSCP, where
3It should be noted that concerns about the accuracy of aggregating NRI data to the county level have been raised
by the National Resources Conservation Service (NRCS). Goodwin and Smith (2003) point out that aggregating other
data collected at the county level, such as crop yields and government payment data, to higher levels of aggregation,
such as the major land resource area (MLRA), may introduce even more severe aggregation problems. As a result,
the county is used as the unit of observation in our study.
4Sheet and rill erosion occurs when layers of soil are removed due to the action of rainfall and subsequent runo®
activities. We do not model wind-induced soil erosion in our study since almost all of our sample counties are located
in areas where wind-induced soil erosion has not been viewed as a problem.
5The lack of compatible government payments data before 1990 prevents us from using a longer time-series to
model producer expectations concerning the magnitude of government payments.
3A is predicted annual soil loss, K is an inherent soil erodibility factor, R is a rainfall erosivity
factor, L is a slope-length factor, S is a slope-steepness factor, C is a cropping management factor,
and P is a factor to incorporate erosion control practices.
The K factor value for a particular soil type is determined from an equation that includes
the following variables: silt percent, sand percent, organic matter content, structure (e.g., ¯ne
granular soil), and permeability . The K factor is assumed to be constant for each soil type,
regardless of the production practices undertaken on the soil or the climatic di®erences associated
with the geographic location of the soil. The rainfall erosivity factor R accounts for the soil erosivity
associated with the impact of rain drops on the soil and the resulting runo® associated with the
impact. It is a function of the kinetic energy associated with the rain drop impact and the maximum
30 minute intensity of the rainfall. The cropping management factor C is determined as the ratio
of soil loss from a speci¯c cropping practice to the soil loss from soil in a tilled, continuously
fallow condition. Among other management activities, this incorporates the e®ects of crop cover,
crop rotation, and tillage systems. The supporting practices factor P accounts for the impact of
erosion control practices, and is constructed as the ratio of the soil loss associated with a particular
erosion control practice to the soil loss using an \up-and-down" hill cropping practice. Among
other things, this factor accounts for di®erent contour plowing and terracing methods (Mitchell
and Bubenzer. 1980).
Water-induced soil erosion is a dynamic and complex process driven by the interaction of phys-
ical, chemical, biological, climatic, and economic factors. Although the process is complex, the
level of soil erosion is primarily determined by soil characteristics (e.g., the slope and permeability
of the land), climate (e.g., the frequency and intensity of rainfall), land use (e.g., cropland vs.
pastureland), cropping practices (e.g., tillage and crop rotation), and conservation practices (e.g.,
cover and terracing). While the soil characteristics and climate factors are exogenous to the farmer,
the choice of land use, cropping practice, and conservation practice are a function of the social and
economic factors.6
For example, the choice of how to use the land is determined by the returns to the alternative
uses of the land. Assuming land meets the eligibility requirements for enrollment in the Conser-
vation Reserve Program, whether or not the land is actually enrolled will depend on the returns
to enrollment, which are primarily a function of the rental rate and cost-share arrangements, ver-
sus the returns to the best alternative use of the land, such as crop production.7 The expected
6These choice variables are also a function of climate and land characteristics. For example, the land use decision
is constrained by the ability of the soil to support the production of a given crop in an economically viable manner.
7Since CRP land is under contract for ten to ¯fteen year periods, the option value of the land may also be a
signi¯cant consideration when deciding whether or not enroll land in the CRP. While an important concern, this is
beyond the scope of the present study.
4returns to crop production are a function of the expected price and yield (which are not known
with certainty at the time the land allocation decision is made), the costs of production, and the
agricultural price (income) support payments available to the farmer. In addition, the variability
of expected returns may be a®ected by the risk management tools that are made available to the
farmer. The choices of cropping and conservation practices are also a function of economic vari-
ables. For example, the adoption of conservation tillage, which reduces soil erosion, has been shown
to be a function, among other things, of farm size and o®-farm employment (Fuglie 1999).
While the inherent erodibility of the soil places some boundaries on potential soil erosion, the
activities undertaken on the land drive changes in the level of soil erosion over time. The basic
belief behind most of our conservation programs is that cultivated cropland is more susceptible to
increases in soil erosion than lands which are noncultivated or used as forest, range, or pasture.
Disregarding the impact of government support programs, the use of the land will depend on the
market returns to the alternative uses. To capture the impact of the expected market returns to
crop production, we included a three-year county-level average of real net returns per harvested
acre for corn, soybeans, and winter wheat in our model. We constructed the revenue for each crop
by multiplying the harvested yield by the state-level market price taken from the NASS online
database. The price was constructed as the average of the monthly state prices for the most active
harvest months for each crop.8
The net return variable was constructed by subtracting the average total production cost per
acre from the revenue for each crop. The total crop production costs were obtained from the
USDA/ERS Commodity Costs and Returns data. The production data were estimated for each
crop and USDA farm resource region on an annual basis. The nominal net return variable was
in°ated to 2001 terms using the producer price index. We divided the net return for each crop by
the total harvested acres for that crop to construct the net return per acre. Finally, the expected
county-level net returns per acre for each crop were calculated as a 3 year average of net returns
as previously constructed.
In addition to market returns, the availability of government income support and risk man-
agement programs provide incentives for farmers to adjust land usage, at least at the margin.
Payments that are directly tied to production (target price-based and loan de¯ciency payments)
provide incentives for farmers to expand acreage and/or crop existing acreage more intensively.
On the other hand, payments that are not tied to current production (AMTA payments) or those
delivered on an ad hoc basis (disaster payments) may provide farmers with little incentive to alter
8The information concerning the most active harvest months for each crop were taken from the \Usual Planting
and Harvesting Dates for U.S. Field Crops" section of the NASS Agricultural Handbook No. 628.
5production.9 Hennessy (1998) has argued that decoupled payments may a®ect crop acreage by
encouraging producers to accept more risk as their wealth increases or by reducing ¯nancial con-
straints that limit their acceptance of more risk.10 In addition, the frequency of ad hoc assistance
may encourage farmers to incorporate those payments into expectations of future income and thus
encourage them to accept greater risk. In addition to the risk management and income support pro-
grams, the federal government has provided payments (e.g., Conservation Reserve Program (CRP)
rental income) to encourage the removal of highly erodible land from production.11 If correctly
targeted, these payments should lead to a reduction in soil erosion.
The impact of these various programs on production choices (and thus soil erosion) is primarily
an empirical question. To capture the impact of these various agricultural programs on soil erosion,
we included the following categories of agricultural payments in our model: (1) target price-based
de¯ciency payments, (2) AMTA payments, (3) loan de¯ciency payments, (4) disaster payments,
and (5) conservation payments. All of these payments are a 3 year average of county-level real
payments per farm acre.
Many people have also expressed concerns about the impact of the provision of federally-
subsidized crop insurance on crop mix, planted acreage, and input use. As demonstrated in Deal
(2004), federally-subsidized crop insurance provides incentives for farmers to alter land allocation
and input use. If those changes bring more erodible land into production, encourage the implemen-
tation of more intensive cropping practices, or discourage the adoption of conservation practices,
they are likely to contribute to higher levels of soil erosion. To capture the impact of federally-
subsidized crop insurance on soil erosion, we included a 3 year average of the percentage of planted
acres in the county that are insured for each crop in our soil erosion equation.
Although we used a reduced-form approach with respect to modeling the impact of government
payments on crop acreage, cropping practice, and conservation practices due to the lack of crop-
speci¯c payments data, we modeled insurance participation as an endogenous variable by modeling
the determinants of insurance purchases within a 2 stage least squares framework. This approach
was chosen since the impact of government payments on soil erosion should be directly attributable
9AMTA payments were authorized by Congress in the FAIR Act of 1996 to replace government support payments
tied to current production and prices. Farmers were eligible to receive AMTA payments if they enrolled acreage in
annual farm programs in any year from 1991 to 1995. These ¯xed payments, which were intended to decline and
¯nally terminate at the end of the FAIR Act in 2002, were based on historical program bene¯ts (which were based
on historical production) and therefore not linked to current production.
10Hennessy's argument assumes that economic agents exhibit declining absolute or relative risk aversion (DARA
or DRRA) preferences. Even with DARA or DRRA preferences, his results indicate that the e®ect is likely to be
small, though statistically signi¯cant.
11The level of CRP payments received are a function of a bidding process whereby landowners submit bids on
land that meet certain requirements, such as being assigned an erodibility index value of 8 or higher. These bids are
accepted or rejected within the context of the program land retirement goals. In addition to CRP rental rates, our
conservation payments data include, among other things, CRP cost-share payments and water conservation payments.
6to their impact on crop acreage, cropping practice, or conservation practice (even though disen-
tangling the individual e®ects may be di±cult), while the impact of government payments (i.e.,
premium rate subsidies) with respect to crop insurance a®ect soil erosion through their impact on
insurance purchases, which may then impact the other choice variables.
In our model of crop insurance demand, we included the producer-paid portion of the insurance
premium rate and the loss ratio (a proxy for expected indemnity payments). We hypothesize that
an increase in the premium rate will reduce crop insurance participation (as measured by the ratio
of insured acres to total planted acres) and will decrease acreage in the planted crop. If that crop
is associated with higher levels of erosion, the increase in the premium rate should reduce the level
of soil erosion. We hypothesize the opposite e®ect for the loss ratio. An increase in the loss ratio
should increase insurance participation and crop acreage. If that crop is associated with higher
levels of erosion, the increase in the loss ratio should increase the level of soil erosion. There is also
evidence that agents exhibit a di®erential response to premium rates when facing di®erent expected
indemnity payments (Goodwin 1993). Speci¯cally, farmers who expect to receive larger indemnity
payments are less responsive to increases in premium rates. To capture this di®erential response,
we included an interaction term of the premium rate and loss ratio.
For given premium rates and indemnity payments, risk-averse farmers should also exhibit a
higher demand for insurance if they face a higher yield risk. To capture the yield risk faced by
the producer, we also included the coe±cient of variation of county average yields. The productive
capacity of the land may also have an impact on insurance demand. Land with high productivity
may reduce the likelihood of a yield shortfall, but may also increase the magnitude of the loss
in the event of crop failure. To capture land productivity, we included the county average water
holding capacity, a primary constraint on agricultural productivity. Although no consensus has been
reached in the empirical literature, crop insurance may act as a substitute for other inputs, such
as fertilizers, in the production process. To capture the impact of fertilizer use on crop insurance
demand, we included a three-year average of county-level fertilizer/chemical expenditures.12 To
capture possible borrowing constraints facing the farmer, we included a 5 year lag of county average
net farm income. We hypothesize that a lower net income stream would encourage borrowing, and
therefore increase the likelihood of the borrower facing insurance purchase requirements set by the
lender. Finally, large farms may be more likely to purchase insurance since, among other things,
they provide higher commission payments that encourage more intensive marketing by insurance
agents. We include county average farm size (in acres) to capture this e®ect.
12A limitation with respect to our expenditure data should be noted. Our data are county-level expenditures and
are not crop-speci¯c. Therefore, we cannot take into account di®erent application rates across di®erent crops.
7In addition to market returns, government program payments, and crop insurance, other fac-
tors may e®ect soil erosion through their impact on acreage allocation and the adoption of crop-
ping/conservation practices. Since cropping activities, such as plowing, are major contributing
factors to soil erosion, land that remains in pasture, range, or forest should exhibit lower levels of
soil erosion than land under cultivation. The soil erosion measure (USLE) is reported in the NRI
only on land that is designated as cropland, pastureland, or CRP land. The previously discussed
variables are included to capture the impact of cropland and CRP use, but modeling pasture use
is more complicated since pasture can be used for a number of activities, such as grazing and hay
production. Given the data limitations, particularly with respect to the derivation of pasture costs,
we chose to forego constructing a net return variable for pasture use. To capture the impact of
pasture use on soil erosion, we used a 5 year lag of the ratio of pasture acres to the sum of crop,
pasture, and CRP acres.
If government program payments and crop insurance encourage farmers to bring economically
marginal land into production, this may include land that is more steeply sloped or more inherently
erodible than land already in production. This land may require more intensive cultivation than
land already in production. As a result, government programs may a®ect our measure of soil
erosion by a®ecting the distribution of the K (inherent erodibility), L (slope length), and S (slope
steepness) factors of land under cultivation. Even if identical cropping practices are used for land
already in production and this new land being brought into production, the new land would be
more likely to contribute to erosion because of its physical characteristics. While bringing new
land into cultivation may alter the distribution of the K, L, and S components of the USLE, it is
unlikely that government programs could a®ect the rainfall erosivity factor (R) since this is likely
not to vary within close geographic proximity (e.g., land within a county). Since it is unlikely
that government policy can a®ect the R factor, we condition this out in our soil erosion estimation
equation.
Therefore, our soil erosion estimation equation can be summarized as follows:
USLE =
P3
i=1 bi ¢ MKTRETi + b4 ¢ DISASTER + b5 ¢ LDP
+b6 ¢ DEFICIENCY + b7 ¢ CONSERV E
+b8 ¢ CONSERV E ¤ EI + b9 ¢ LAGPAST + b10 ¢ RFACT
+
P13
i=11 bi ¢ INSUREi + ²
(1)
where USLE is the measure of water-induced soil erosion measured in tons/acre/year, MKTRETi
is the market return to crop i, DISASTER is the county average real disaster payments per planted
acre, DEFICIENCY is the county average real de¯ciency payments per harvested acre, LDP is
the county average real loan de¯ciency payments per planted acre, CONSERV E is the county
average real conservation payments per CRP acre, CONSERV E ¤ EI is an interaction term of
8conservation payments and the soil erodibility index, LAGPAST is the 5 year lagged percentage
of pasture acreage, RFACT is the rainfall factor from the USLE, INSUREi is the percentage of
crop acres insured for crop i, and ² is an error term. De¯ciency payments were not available after
1996 and are not included in the 1997 model. AMTA payments were not available before 1996, and
were not included in the 1992 model.
There is a crop insurance demand equation for each of the three crops in our model. The general
form of each equation can be summarized as follows:
INSDMD = b0 + b1 ¢ PREM + b2 ¢ LR + b3 ¢ PREM ¤ LR+
b4 ¢ CV Y LD + b5 ¢ FMACRES + b6 ¢ NETINCOME+
b7 ¢ AWC + b8 ¢ CHEMEX + ²
(2)
where INSDMD is the percentage of planted acres that are insured, PREM is the producer-
paid premium rate, LR is the loss ratio, PREM ¤ LR is an interaction term conditioning the
impact of the premium rate on the loss ratio, CV Y LD is the coe±cient of variation of mean yield,
FMACRES is the county average farm size (in acres), NETINCOME is a 5 year lagged average
of net farm income, AWC is the county average water holding capacity, CHEMEX is the county
average fertilizer/chemical expenditures, and ² is an error term.
Our sample consists of counties where corn, soybeans, and winter wheat account for more than
90% of harvested acres in the county.13 In addition, we exclude any counties that meet this criteria
but fail to produce all three crops. This results in a sample of 778 counties in 1992 and 773 counties
in 1997. Figure 4.1 provides a map of the counties contained in our 1992 sample.14 Our sample
consists of counties from the upper Midwest states (e.g., Illinois and Ohio), the mid-Atlantic states
(e.g., Virginia and Maryland), the northern sections of the Southeastern states (e.g., North Carolina
and Tennessee) and the lower Plains states (e.g., Nebraska and Kansas). Excluding the Mississippi
Portal region which is not well represented in our sample, we include most of the areas that have
exhibited the highest levels of sheet and rill erosion and are of the greatest concern.
Table 1 contains the means and standard deviations of sheet and rill erosion by state in our
sample for the 1992 and 1997 periods. In addition, the table contains the number of counties (N)
from each state in our sample. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Kansas, and Ohio generally contain
the largest number of counties, while Arkansas, Louisiana, Delaware, and Minnesota generally
contain the fewest number of counties contained in our sample. Minnesota contained ¯ve counties
that met the criteria in 1992 but none that did in 1997. In 1992 the mean soil erosion rate for our
entire sample was 3.3113, though the rates ranged from a high of 5.7792 in South Dakota to a low of
13Total crop acreage includes acreage from the production of corn, soybeans, winter wheat, durum wheat, other
spring wheat, grain sorghum, upland cotton, rye, barley, oats, peanuts, and rice.
14A map for the 1997 sample period is not included since most of the counties appear in both samples.
9Figure 1: Sample Counties (1992)
1.7901 in Oklahoma. The mean soil erosion rate declined to 2.8000 by 1997 for our sample, though
a few states (Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, and Pennsylvania) still exhibited sheet and rill erosion rates
in excess of 3.5 tons/acre/year.
This study makes use of data collected from a number of sources. In particular, we make
extensive use of 1992 and 1997 National Resources Inventory (NRI) data. Among other things,
the measure of sheet and rill erosion (USLE) is contained in the NRI data. The crop yield and
price data are taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) online database.
The production cost data are contained in the Economic Research Service (ERS) Commodity Cost
and Returns database. County-level Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) payment data from
the 1990-1998 period are taken from unpublished USDA-FSA sources. Crop insurance program
data are taken from the RMA's unpublished county level "summary of business" database. Farm
acreage data were taken from the Census of Agriculture. County-level mean average water hold-
ing capacity (AWC) was constructed from data included in the SOILS-5 database. All nominal
economic variables are in°ated to 2001 terms using the producer price index. A list of variables
and summary statistics for the 1992 model can be found in Table 2, while a list of variables and
summary statistics for the 1997 model can be found in Table 3.
10Table 1: Sample County Soil Erosion Rates by State
1992 1997 State
N Mean St. Dev. N Mean St. Dev.
Alabama 5 2.7396 1.1348 7 1.9577 0.2935
Arkansas 1 1.0817 ¢¢¢ 1 1.8103 ¢¢¢
Delaware 2 2.2437 1.8115 2 1.9166 1.4265
Georgia 8 1.2405 0.7505 2 1.6937 0.9004
Illinois 98 4.1906 1.6984 87 3.8175 1.6230
Indiana 92 2.9948 1.1574 88 2.6401 0.9910
Iowa 64 4.9747 2.4079 53 4.1609 1.9941
Kansas 37 2.5433 2.0995 53 1.9640 1.1514
Kentucky 63 3.3180 1.3258 54 2.5412 1.0476
Louisiana 3 1.8943 1.8040 3 2.8611 0.9552
Maryland 20 4.4983 3.1220 20 3.9254 2.9554
Michigan 45 1.6582 0.9832 39 1.4395 0.8289
Minnesota 5 2.8327 1.0263 0 ¢¢¢ ¢¢¢
Mississippi 11 2.3828 1.0289 7 3.1334 1.7526
Missouri 53 4.6949 2.1127 69 3.3194 1.6631
Nebraska 49 2.7397 1.7806 42 2.5035 1.4937
New Jersey 10 3.9930 2.1733 10 3.4422 1.7489
North Carolina 26 3.8058 3.1497 25 3.1025 2.7826
Ohio 59 2.8347 1.1666 67 2.2428 0.9281
Oklahoma 17 1.7901 0.9404 15 1.3702 0.7036
Pennsylvania 9 4.9151 1.6169 18 4.0701 1.3056
South Carolina 9 1.8373 0.7976 6 1.6346 0.9739
South Dakota 1 5.7792 ¢¢¢ 13 2.1483 1.0032
Tennessee 51 1.9825 1.3135 39 1.6465 1.3105
Texas 0 ¢¢¢ ¢¢¢ 1 0.5833 ¢¢¢
Virginia 29 3.5414 1.8867 35 3.0231 1.2340
Wisconsin 11 3.5062 0.9917 17 3.0318 1.3281
Total 778 3.3113 1.9983 773 2.8000 1.6605
3 Results
Table 4 presents the results from our 2SLS estimation of the 1992 model speci¯cation. In our
soil erosion estimation equation, the 3 year average (1991-1993) of net market returns for corn are
positively and signi¯cantly associated with higher levels of soil erosion, though higher net market
returns for soybeans are not signi¯cantly associated with higher levels of soil erosion. Counties
that experience higher net market returns for winter wheat exhibit signi¯cantly lower levels of
soil erosion. A priori expectations are that row crops (for example, corn and soybeans) should be
associated with higher levels of soil erosion than small grain crops (for example, winter wheat). If
higher net market returns lead to higher planted acreage, our results support the a priori expectation
that the returns to planting corn/soybeans will be associated with higher levels of soil erosion, while
winter wheat returns will be associated with lower soil erosion.15
The focal point of our analysis is the impact of government program payments and crop insur-
ance on soil erosion. The coe±cient estimates on loan de¯ciency payments and de¯ciency payments
are insigni¯cant at the 10% level. While de¯ciency payments were not provided for soybean produc-
15The Pearson correlation coe±cient between corn and soybean net market returns is 0.72, so a potential collinearity
problem exists and identi¯cation of the separate e®ects may be di±cult.
11tion, corn and winter wheat were program crops that were eligible to receive de¯ciency payments.16
The overall insigni¯cant impact of these support payments may indicate the o®setting e®ects of
incentives to increase production in response to the reduction in risk and conservation compliance
requirements associated with the receipt of government program payments.17 Since disaster pay-
ments are received after production decisions (e.g., crop mix and cultivation practice) are made, it
is somewhat surprising that they exhibit a signi¯cant positive impact on soil erosion.18
An increase in conservation payments is associated with a decrease in soil erosion. This provides
support to the argument that conservation payments that encourage farmers to remove erodible land
from production and to adopt conservation practices are an e®ective tool to reduce soil erosion. The
interaction term indicates that conservation payments exhibit a di®erential impact on soil erosion
given di®erent levels of soil erodibility. Without the inclusion of the interaction term, conservation
payments exhibit a signi¯cant positive impact on soil erosion. Without controlling for di®erences
in soil erodibility, this should not be surprising since conservation payments, if correctly targeted,
are higher on more highly erodible land (i.e., land that is most likely to experience soil erosion).
Given that land used as pasture requires little (or no) cultivation, we would expect to ¯nd
that the higher the lagged percentage of land used as pasture, the lower the level of soil erosion.
This is consistent with our ¯ndings. As expected, the rainfall erosivity factor is associated with
higher levels of soil erosion. The predicted values for corn insurance participation from our 2SLS
estimation are associated with higher levels of soil erosion, while wheat insurance participation is
associated with lower levels of soil erosion. Both coe±cient estimates are signi¯cant at the 10%
level, while soybean insurance participation exhibits no signi¯cant impact on soil erosion. Assuming
that higher insurance participation is associated with higher planted acreage, our results support
our ¯ndings with respect to net market returns as to the impact of row crops (at least in the case
of corn) and small grains (winter wheat) on soil erosion.
The results from the 2SLS estimation of insurance participation generally con¯rm a priori ex-
pectations. The producer-paid portion of the crop insurance premium rate is negatively associated
with insurance participation for corn and soybeans, though is not signi¯cantly associated with
wheat insurance participation. The loss ratio is positively related to corn and wheat insurance
participation, while the coe±cient of variation of mean yield is positively associated with insurance
16We also estimated a model using total government payments (excluding conservation payments) and found that
total payments exhibited no statistically signi¯cant impact on soil erosion.
17We also estimated two alternative versions of our model, conditioning out the cropping and management practices
in one model and the physical characteristics, such as slope and inherent erodibility, in the other model. While the
overall e®ect of de¯ciency payments is insigni¯cant, they exhibit a statistically signi¯cant impact on cropping and
conservation practices, controlling for the physical characteristics of the land, but exhibit no impact on the the
distribution of the physical characteristics.
18Though signi¯cant, the magnitude of the change is very small. A doubling of disaster payments from its mean
value of $1.50 per farm acre would lead to a 4% increase in the level of soil erosion from its mean value of 3.3113.
12participation for all three crops. The coe±cient estimates on the interaction term indicate that
the producers of all three crops exhibit a di®erential response to premium rate increases if those
increases are conditioned on the expected indemnity payments (i.e., loss ratios). Producers who
receive higher indemnity payments are less responsive to increases in premium rates. Land quality,
as proxied by county average water holding capacity, is associated with signi¯cantly higher corn and
soybean insurance participation. This may indicate that producers are more willing to insure more
productive land since any systematic crop failure will be associated with higher levels of foregone
production. In all three cases, larger farms (in acreage terms) are associated with higher levels
of insurance participation, while chemical expenditures and lagged net farm income are negatively
associated with insurance participation. In particular, this indicates that lower net income from
the preceding 5 year period is associated with higher insurance purchases. This may re°ect insur-
ance purchase requirements imposed by lenders if producers ¯nd it necessary to borrow funds to
supplement the lower net income.
Table 5 presents the results from our 2SLS estimation of the 1997 model speci¯cation. In our
soil erosion estimation equation, the 3 year average (1996-1998) of net market returns for all three
crops are not signi¯cantly associated with soil erosion. These results are inconsistent with the
results from the earlier period that indicate that the production of row crops (at least corn) is
associated with higher levels of soil erosion, while small grain (e.g., winter wheat) production is
associated with lower levels of soil erosion. This is somewhat surprising since the elimination of
planting restrictions in 1996 should elevate the importance of market returns to the producer's
production decisions.
The coe±cient estimates on disaster payments and AMTA payments are insigni¯cant at the
10% level.19 Since AMTA payments are not tied to current production decisions, it is not surprising
that they do not exhibit a signi¯cant impact on soil erosion.20 Consistent with the results from
the earlier period, loan de¯ciency payments exhibit no signi¯cant impact on soil erosion. Unlike
the results from the earlier period, disaster payments are not associated with higher levels of soil
erosion.21
As in the 1992 speci¯cation, an increase in conservation payments is associated with a decrease
in soil erosion. This provides support to the argument that conservation payments that encourage
19We also estimated two alternative versions of our model, conditioning out the cropping and management practices
in one model and the physical characteristics, such as slope and inherent erodibility, in the other model. While the
overall e®ect of the AMTA payments is insigni¯cant, they exhibit a statistically signi¯cant impact on cropping
and conservation practices, controlling for the physical characteristics of the land, but exhibit a negative, though
statistically insigni¯cant, impact on the the distribution of the physical characteristics that one would expect with
changes in land use.
20If these payments a®ect soil erosion through their impact on crop acreage, our results lend support to the argument
that the wealth e®ects of decoupled payments are probably small in magnitude.
21While county average disaster payments in the 1991-1993 period were $1.50 per farm acre, the mean disaster
payments in the 1996-1998 period were $0.09 per farm acre.
13farmers to remove erodible land from production and to adopt conservation practices are an e®ective
tool to reduce soil erosion. The interaction term indicates that conservation payments exhibit a
di®erential impact on soil erosion given di®erent levels of soil erodibility. Without the inclusion of
the interaction term, conservation payments exhibit a signi¯cant positive impact on soil erosion.
As in the previous period, we found that the lagged pasture variable is associated with lower the
levels of soil erosion, and the rainfall erosivity factor is associated with higher levels of soil erosion.
As in the 1992 speci¯cation, the predicted values for corn insurance participation from our 2SLS
estimation are associated with higher levels of soil erosion, while wheat insurance participation is
associated with lower levels of soil erosion. Both coe±cient estimates are signi¯cant at the 10%
level, while soybean insurance participation exhibits no signi¯cant impact on soil erosion. Assuming
that higher insurance participation is associated with higher planted acreage, our results indicate
that counties with a higher production of row crops (corn and soybeans) tend to have higher levels
of soil erosion than counties that plant more acreage in small grains (winter wheat).
The insurance participation results from the 1996-1998 period are not generally consistent with
those from the 1991-1993 period. This is not surprising since a number of changes in the crop
insurance program occurred between these periods. In particular, revenue insurance products
were available in the 1996-1998 period, but not in the 1991-1993 period.22 In addition, e®orts
to increase producer participation led the government to increase premium rate subsidies by the
later period. The biggest di®erence occurred with respect to the impact of the premium rate on
insurance participation. The producer-paid portion of the crop insurance premium rate is positively
associated with insurance participation for all three crops, though not signi¯cantly associated with
soybean insurance participation.
The expected indemnity payment (i.e., loss ratio) is statistically insigni¯cant for soybeans and
wheat, while the coe±cient of variation of mean yield is statistically signi¯cant for only soybean in-
surance participation. The coe±cient estimates on the interaction term indicate that there is not a
di®erential response to premium increases if those increases are conditioned on the expected indem-
nity payments for soybean or wheat producers. Land quality, as proxied by county average water
holding capacity, is associated with signi¯cantly higher corn and soybean insurance participation,
but lower, though statistically insigni¯cant, wheat insurance participation. This may indicate that
producers are more willing to insure more productive land since any systematic crop failure will
be associated with higher levels of foregone production. In all three cases, larger farms (in acreage
terms) are associated with higher levels of insurance participation, while chemical expenditures
are negatively associated with insurance participation. Finally, there is a statistically signi¯cant
22Attempts were made to model revenue insurance (in addition to yield insurance), but the lack of widespread
availability and adoption during this period limited the sample size to an unacceptable level.
14positive relationship between lagged net income and insurance participation with respect to corn
and soybeans, with no signi¯cant impact on wheat insurance participation.
4 Conclusions
The goal of this paper is to extend the preliminary work of Goodwin and Smith (2003) evaluating
the impact of government program payments and crop insurance on soil erosion. Using a 2SLS
framework, we estimate a system of four equations (soil erosion and three insurance participation
equations) for a sample of counties where corn, soybeans, and winter wheat make up over 90% of
planted acreage in the county. Therefore, our sample includes counties from many of the areas,
such as the primary corn and soybean producing areas of the Midwest, that experience high levels
of water-induced soil erosion.
Our results indicate that counties that receive higher conservation payments experience lower
levels of soil erosion if those payments are conditioned on soil erodibility; otherwise, those payments
are positively associated with soil erosion. This is expected since conservation payments are ideally
targeted toward land that is more inherently erodible or land that has experienced greater levels
of past soil erosion. We ¯nd that an increase in disaster payments is associated with a statisti-
cally signi¯cant increase in soil erosion for the earlier period, but exhibited no signi¯cant impact
during the later period. In addition, target price-based de¯ciency payments (1991-1993), loan de¯-
ciency payments (1991-1993 and 1996-1998), and AMTA payments (1996-1998) had no statistically
signi¯cant impact on soil erosion.
Goodwin and Smith found that crop insurance participation (as proxied by the ratio of insured
to total crop acres) exhibited a signi¯cant negative impact on soil erosion, though the impact was
small in magnitude. While they used total participation for all crops in their sample, we estimate
separate equations for each crop (corn, soybeans, and winter wheat) in our sample. When using an
alternative measure of total insured acres for the three combined crops, our results con¯rm those of
Goodwin and Smith. The results from our estimation of separate insurance participation equations
indicate substantial di®erences across crops. In both sample periods, higher corn insurance partic-
ipation is associated with signi¯cantly higher soil erosion, while wheat insurance participation is
associated with signi¯cantly lower soil erosion.
To the extent that soil erosion contributes to a reduction in environmental amenities, such a
water quality, our results indicate that concerns over the impact of government income support and
risk management programs on indicators of environmental quality may be exaggerated. We ¯nd
that conservation payments are associated with lower levels of soil erosion, but other government
program payments seem to have little impact on soil erosion, at least in the areas represented by
15our sample. On the other hand, crop insurance participation, particularly for corn and wheat,
seems to have a signi¯cant impact on soil erosion. It should be noted that our results apply only to
counties that have a large percentage of total planted acres devoted to corn, soybean, and winter
wheat production. Having said that, our sample incorporates many of the areas of primary concern
with respect to the impact of agricultural practices on water-induced soil erosion.
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20Table 4. 2SLS Estimates of Soil Erosion Model (1992)
Variable Soil Erosion Corn Insurance Soybean Insurance Wheat Insurance
Intercept 1:6840¤ ¡0:2223¤ ¡0:1331¤ 0:0821



























Premium ¡1:4327¤ ¡0:7698¤ ¡0:3718
(0:4029) (0:2225) (0:2318)
Loss Ratio (LR) 0:0206¤ 0:0008 0:0101¤
(0:0064) (0:0078) (0:0026)
Premium*LR 0:4271¤ 0:4974¤ 0:0968¤
(0:1053) (0:1020) (0:0386)
CV Yield 0:0051¤ 0:0062¤ 0:0011¤
(0:0009) (0:0013) (0:0006)
AWC 1:7950¤ 1:0775¤ ¡0:4979
(0:3970) (0:3920) (0:3334)
Farm Acres 0:0553¤ 0:0503¤ 0:0418¤
(0:0081) (0:0082) (0:0066)
Fertilizer ¡0:3059¤ ¡0:3354¤ ¡0:2234¤
(0:1569) (0:1506) (0:1239)
Lagged Income ¡0:0357¤ ¡0:0317¤ ¡0:0175¤
(0:0107) (0:0106) (0:0082)
The standard errors of the coe±cients estimates are in parentheses.
The asterisks indicate statistical signi¯cance at the ® = :10 or smaller level.
21Table 5. 2SLS Estimates of Soil Erosion Model (1997)
Variable Soil Erosion Corn Insurance Soybean Insurance Wheat Insurance
Intercept 0:9378¤ 0:1571¤ 0:1503¤ 0:4850¤



























Premium 3:2750¤ 0:1941 0:6272¤
(0:6548) (0:5575) (0:3773)
Loss Ratio (LR) 0:0163¤ ¡0:0007 ¡0:0001
(0:0058) (0:0017) (0:0044)
Premium*LR ¡0:2720¤ ¡0:0374 0:0578
(0:1482) (0:1673) (0:1037)
CV Yield 0:0005 0:0093¤ ¡0:0007
(0:0009) (0:0011) (0:0007)
AWC 1:6714¤ 1:8027¤ ¡0:5561
(0:3802) (0:4049) (0:4680)
Farm Acres 0:0311¤ 0:0278¤ 0:0499¤
(0:0052) (0:0053) (0:0061)
Fertilizer ¡1:1390¤ ¡1:3259¤ ¡1:2035¤
(0:2185) (0:2202) (0:2396)
Lagged Income 0:0178¤ 0:0196¤ 0:0035
(0:0059) (0:0060) (0:0069)
The standard errors of the coe±cients estimates are in parentheses.
The asterisks indicate statistical signi¯cance at the ® = :10 or smaller level.
22